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The Creditor and the Community
In Idaho
W. J. Brockelbank*
A great deal has been written on the assets of the com-
munity, but much less on its liabilities. In this article it is pro-
posed to have a look at the community from the point of view of
the outsider who has to do business with one or the other of its
owners, the husband and wife. Since, nowadays, nearly every-
body is married, this look at the outsider and the community will
necessarily cover nearly every problem of collection of the
average creditor.
Community property exists in only eight states.' No recent
converts have been made. When the income tax increased to a
point where it became a serious burden on the taxpayer, certain
states adopted the community system as a measure of tax relief.2
But when Congress provided for the system of split income
of husband and wife, so that the community system no longer
gave a tax advantage, the states that had adopted the community
system as a measure of tax relief stumbled over each other in
the rush to repeal.4 This was probably all for the best. Those
states never understood community property and if it could not
be used for the intended purpose it was better not to use it at all.
Yet it is rather significant that, in the brief period when it
was in force, not one of those states was convinced of any in-
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
1. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington.
2. Oregon, Oklahoma, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Hawaii.
3. Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, 62 STAT. 114 (1948). See Rubin & Cham-
pagne, Some Community Property Aspects of the 1948 Revenue Act, 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1 (1948).
4. Michigan repealed her community property statute thirty-eight days
after Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1948. Mich. Pub. Acts 1948(E.S.),
No. 39, p. 95; MicH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 26:216(21)-26:216(25). The Pennsyl-
vania act had been held unconstitutional in Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). The Oregon, Nebraska, Okla-
homa and Hawaii acts were repealed in 1949. Moshofsky, Repeal of the
Community-Property Law, 28 ORE. L. REV. 311 (1949); Note, Epilogue to the
Commun4ty Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COL. L. REv. 332-51
(1950); Legislation, Community Property Laws-Repeal, 28 NEB. L. REV. 142
(1948).
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trinsic merit of the system as a solution of marital property
problems. It is believed that one of the stumbling blocks to the
adoption of the community system anywhere is the inadequacy
of its dealing with the rights of creditors. The common law
states, in the brief look they were afforded at the community
system, sought a simple answer to the question: how will it
operate for the ordinary creditor who must do business with
one or both spouses? First, they found eight different answers
and, second, each of them was complex and uncertain.
The object of the present study is not to hold up the Idaho
solution of the creditor's difficulties as the ideal solution. Nor is
it expected that any converts will be made. The purpose is rather
to point out the inadequacies of the system as it now exists in
order that other community property states may have some
basis for comparison and especially in order that we, in Idaho,
may fill in some of the gaps and thus improve the situation for
use by ourselves.
I
The community system comes to us from the civil law.5 One
of the characteristics of the civil law is codification. 6 A civilian
expects and usually gets an answer to every question from the
code. The common law lawyer is beginning to adopt this idea.
In recent years many important subjects of the law have been
codified7 and much that remains is covered by the Restatements.8
So when the merchant, who has done business with and extended
credit to a married person, asks, "Where do I stand and what
5. 1 DE FUNIACK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY C. 1 (1943); Kirkwood,
Historical Background and Objectives of the Law of Community Property
in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1936); Lobinger, The Marital
Community: Its Origin and Diffusion, 14 A.B.A.J. 211 (1928); Loewy, Spanish
Community of Acquests and Gains and its Adoption and Modification by
State of California, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 32 (1912).
6. In studying French law we "pass into a world governed by codes....
[A] code is supposed . . . to provide a fresh start in all those parts of the
law with which it deals .... [Ilt should be interpreted only in the light of
its own provisions and definitions." AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH
LAW 4 (1935); BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 6-14 (1936).
7. Important segments of our law have been codified. As examples one
may cite the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law, the Warehouse Receipts Act, the Bills of Lading
Act, the Stock Transfer Act, the Partnership Act, the Limited Partnership
Act, the Model Business Corporation Act, and a host of other uniform acts
on particular subjects. "The center of gravity of the legal system has been
shifting to legislation." Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated
Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A.J. 794, 795 (1953).
8. Restatements cover the subjects of Agency, Conflict of Laws, Con-
tracts, Judgments, Property, Restitution, Security, Torts, Trusts, the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Model Code of Evidence.
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property is available for the payment of my claim?" he is entitled
to a simple straightforward answer. Any system of law that
cannot give him a simple answer is not only unsuitable for ex-
port, it is unsuitable for use at home.
To begin, we may eliminate, with a word, the consideration
of the creditor's rights against the single person. These rights
in Idaho do not differ materially from the rights of creditors
against single persons elsewhere. Section 11-201 of the Idaho
Code of 1947 provides that "all goods, chattels, moneys and
other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein
of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property
and rights of property, seized and held under attachment in the
action, are liable to execution." Particular provision is made
for corporate shares and gold dust 9 and debts owing to the
debtor.' The general exemption law in Idaho" is similar to that
in most states and of course the creditor expects to be subject to
the statute of limitations,1 2 the homestead laws' 3 and the law
of bankruptcy. 4 All these provisions apply not only to single
persons, but also to married persons whenever the debt is a
separate debt.
But what of the community and community debts?
Before proceeding it may be well to clarify and simplify our
problem by asking what are the different kinds of debts and what
are the different kinds of property that may be subjected to
their payment?
First, all debts are incurred either before or after marriage.
Of course, antenuptial debts are subject to the above provisions
concerning the debts of single persons, but the division is worthy
of notice in its relation to the community because the question
must be asked, how far is community property available for the
satisfaction of antenuptial debts? May a person who has no
property beyond what is covered by the exemption laws avoid
payment by getting married? Is this escape mechanism the same
for both men and women?
From another point of view, debts may be classified as arising
out of contracts, torts or other obligations imposed by law. This
9. IDAHO CODE § 11-201 (1947).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. § 11-205.
12. Id. §§ 5-201-5-240.
13. Id. §§ 55-1001-55-1304.
14. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1952).
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classification is desirable, for while the capacity of a man and
woman to incur debts in each of these subdivisions is the same
prior to marriage, there may be marked differences between the
male and female capacity after marriage.
The contract container and the tort container are simple
enough. They bring into play the whole law of contracts and
torts. No elaboration is necessary. By "other obligations im-
posed by law" is meant a broad catch-all subdivision that will
include not only the obligation to pay taxes, family support,
fines and criminal penalties, but also every other obligation and
especially those growing out of the field which used to be called
quasi-contracts and constructive trusts, but which today, in most
law schools, travels under the vocable "restitution."'15
Finally we must divide antenuptial debts into the two class-
es: those incurred by the man and those incurred by the woman.
There will be no difference between these two classes of debts
so far as the availability of the separate property of each debtor
is concerned, but each class may very well involve different treat-
ment when it comes to the availability of community property
for their satisfaction.
The above classification of antenuptial debts will hold good
for the postnuptial debt, except to observe that postnuptial debts
should first of all be classified as community debts and separate
debts. Beyond that, we must notice again that each may grow out
of a contract, a tort or other obligation imposed by law and may
be incurred either by husband or the wife.
Coming now to a classification of the different kinds of
property that may be subjected to the payment of each class of
debt, we must first isolate the separate property of the wife and
the separate property of the husband. Then comes community
property. Is it necessary to subdivide further? It would greatly
simplify both the learning and the practice of law if it were
not. However, simplification of learning or practice is and should
be of little persuasive effect in the realm of social values. The
Idaho legislature of 1881 set up a special kind of community
property, viz., "rents, issues and profits" of the wife's separate
property and "all compensation due or owing for her personal
15. The term "restitution" has been given greater currency by its use in
the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Construc-
tive Trusts. Two valuable casebooks on the subject by Professors Patterson
and Thurston are in current use in the law schools.
[VOL. XV
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services" (both of which are community property in Idaho)' 6
and provided that this special kind of community property
should be "exempt from execution against her husband.1 7 Thus
the property available for the payments of debts must be di-
vided into four classes: The separate property of the wife, the
separate property of the husband, the special kind of community
property covered by Section 11-204 and finally community prop-
erty outside of Section 11-204. The above scheme of classification
is set up in Table I.
Since this table gives a complete list of debts and the kinds
of property available for their satisfaction, its use makes pos-
sible the testing of a given system of law for completeness and
the appraisal of its over all effectiveness. It is the purpose of
this article thus to test the law of Idaho.
II
We shall attempt to fill in the pigeon holes of the table by
answers contained in the statutes and decisions. Let us begin
with the statutes. They are meager indeed.
For purpose of reference they are set out in a footnote.18
It will be noticed that all three sections state explicitly what
property is not liable. The creditor of the husband must touch
neither the separate property of the wife nor the "rents, issues
and profits" of the separate property of the wife nor the "com-
pensation due or owing for her personal services."' 9 Neither
must the antenuptial creditor of the wife touch the separate
property of the husband. But as to what property is liable, there
is only one statement. Section 32-911 says that the separate
property of the wife is liable for "her own debts contracted
before or after marriage." Beyond this there is silence.
It will be noticed that silence encompasses nearly all of the
community property and nearly all of the separate property of
16. IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1947).
17. Id. § 11-204.
18. Ibid.: "Exemption in favor of married woman. All real and personal
estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her marriage, or to
which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all the rents,
issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her per-
sonal services, is exempt from execution against her husband."
Id. § 32-910: "Liability for antenuptial debts. The separate property of
the husband is not liable for the debts of the wife contracted before the
marriage."
Id. § 32-911: "Wife's liability for personal debts. The separate property
of the wife is not liable for the debts of her husband, but is liable for her
own debts contracted before or after marriage."
19. Id. § 11-204.
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the husband. Yet the separate property of the husband and the
community property together will constitute just about all of
the property that is owned by the average couple. This means
that the creditor who seeks an answer in the statutes as to what
property is available to the payment of. his claim will find a
statement concerning only a negligible part of the family prop-
erty and this statement, so far as it goes, will tell him, not what
property he may attach, but what property he may not attach.
He must conclude that as a practical matter the statutes
have failed to give him information as to what he can do.
III
In view of the incompleteness of the statutes, the creditor
must seek to fill in the gap from the cases. What will he find?
The Supreme Court, unlike the legislature, cannot make
law ad libitum. Even to make law by the slow glacier-like
process, which has given us the common law, the court must
await a case. In Idaho, on the question of the availability of the
different elements of property classified in Table I for the pay-
ment of the debts of the spouses, the Supreme Court has done a
lot of waiting. In fact in only a very few cases has the court
had an opportunity to make a decision.
First, it is not surprising to find that the cases hold that
the separate property of the wife is liable for her separate debts.
These may be independent decisions or cases simply enforcing
Section 32-911 that "the separate property of the wife . .. is
liable for her own debts contracted before or after marriage. ' 20
That the separate property of the husband is liable for his
own debts may be taken for granted. No case before the Supreme
Court has ever raised the point and the legislator considered it
unnecessary to state the principle in the section where for rea-
sons of symmetry one would expect to find it (Section 32-910).
Evans v. Kroutinger and McCarthy v. Paris21 held that the
separate property of the wife could not be taken by the creditors
of the husband.
As to the liability of community property the simplest case
20. Boise Association of Credit Men Ltd. v. Glenn Ferry Meat Co., 48
Idaho 600, 283 Pac. 1038 (1930); Briggs v. Mason, 44 Idaho 283, 256 Pac. 368
(1927); Sassaman v. Root, 37 Idaho 588, 218 Pac. 374 (1923); Dernham and
Kaufmann v. Rowley, 4 Idaho 753, 44 Pac. 643 (1896); Bassett v. Beam, 4
Idaho 106, 36 Pac. 501 (1894).
21. 9 Idaho 153, 72 Pac. 882 (1903) and 46 Idaho 165, 267 Pac. 232 (1928).
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is one holding that it is available for the payment of community
debts. While no case on so simple an issue has ever been ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, Gustin v. Byam22 held that a wife
did not make out a case of fraud when she proved that a hus-
band, shortly before divorce, allowed what was presumably a
community creditor to satisfy his claim from community per-
sonalty.
While the rule that community property is liable for com-
munity debts needs no belaboring, what about its availability
for the payment of the separate debts of the spouses? Idaho
has arrived at the position that it is liable for the separate debts
of the husband but is not liable for the separate debts of the
wife. In the important case of Holt v. Empey23 a creditor for
the separate debt of the husband was allowed to satisfy his claim
from the community. The court did not inquire whether the
separate debt in question was antenuptial or postnuptial. It
simply held that "community real estate is liable to attachment
and execution for the debts of the husband whether incurred
for his own use or for the benefit of the community." The basis
of the decision was that there was no reason to depart from the
general rule announced in 5 Ruling Case Law 858 that commu-
nity property is liable for the separate debts, obligations and
liabilities of the husband.
In the important decision of Hall v. Johns24 in 1909, the wife
had borrowed money for her own use and benefit, and the surety
on her obligation, having been compelled to pay, sought reim-
bursement. The trial court's opinion that her husband was not
liable and that the judgment against the wife could not be
satisfied out of the common property was affirmed. The decision,
in itself, probably states present law; but several dicta of the
court would be of questionable authority today. For instance,
the court states that title to community property is in the
husband and, during the existence of the community, the wife's
interest is a mere expectancy. The contrary was held in Kohny
v. Dunbar in 1912.25
It is uncertain whether the court in Hall v. Johns was of the
22. 41 Idaho 538, 240 Pac. 600 (1925). But a wife may make out a case
of fraud if she proves that her husband connives with another to bring a
collusive suit in order to defeat the interest of the divorce-seeking wife in
the community. Pittock v. Pittock, 15 Idaho 47, 96 Pac. 212 (1908).
23. 32 Idaho 106, 178 Pac. 703 (1919).
24. 17 Idaho 224, 105 Pac. 71 (1909).
25. 21 Idaho 258, 121 Pac. 544 (1912).
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opinion that the wife did not validly contract for want of capa-
city or whether having contracted, the husband and so the com-
munity was not liable therefor. In any case the court stated
that the community property cannot be bound by postnuptial
contracts of the wife made for the use and benefit of her own
separate property and for this proposition it seemed appropriate
to the court to cite a Michigan case holding that a husband is
not liable for money lent to a wife. The same sort of reference
to the common law to fill up gaps left by the statutes is employed
in an early California case.2 6 This method ignores the whole
history of community property. It may be all right to take over
bodily a principle from the common law if, after an examination
of the background of Spanish law from which we took the law
of community property, no principle is found, but to do so un-
consciously, as if a case in community property is "just another
case" like those in contracts or torts or other common law sub-
jects, is to demonstrate an ignorance of the wrench of historical
continuity involved. One modern scholar has characterized this
method as one of "startling obtuseness" 27 and "erroneous '28 and
another as "unfortunate."2 9
The most recent case involving the possible liability of com-
munity property is Great American Indemnity Co. of New York
v. Garrison.30 In that case a husband who was a bonded treas-
urer of Clearwater County, Idaho, misappropriated state funds
which his surety was later obliged to pay. The suit for reim-
bursement was heard in the federal court on grounds of diversity
of citizenship. The court sitting in Washington purported, under
the Erie decision, to follow the Washington conflicts of laws
rule, making Idaho law applicable as being the place where the
debt arose or the place where the tort was committed. Finding
no Idaho law the court said that there was no reason to suppose
that the Idaho Supreme Court would apply the rule of contract
debts, which makes the community liable, to the husband's torts
in the face of the almost universally accepted principle that the
marital community is not liable for the husband's torts. For this
proposition, cases from Washington and the current encyclo-
pedias are cited. The encyclopedias repeat the citations from
Washington and all the cases from other states. The latter are
26. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860).
27. 1 DE FUNiAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 111 (1943).
28. Id. at 439.
29. Jacob, The Law of Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1, 5
(1931).
30. 75 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1948).
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not uniformly in favor of immunity from liability. So one can
just about say that the court, instead of applying "a universally
accepted principle," is in reality applying Washington law to an
Idaho tort. It is well to notice that this case, unlike the ordinary
case, does not add the reasoned conviction of an additional court,
for under the Erie decision the federal court does not express its
own convictions but only those of the state court it happens to
be following. Since the case is not binding on the Supreme
Court of Idaho, it should not be taken too seriously as a monu-
ment to the eternal law of Idaho. So far as it goes and, looking
only at its exact holding, we can say that there is no community
liability for the tort of a married man committed in connection
with his function as a public officer.
In regard to the question whether the separate property of
the wife is available to satisfy a community debt, a preliminary
question arises in Idaho as to the capacity of a married woman
to contract. An ancient territorial statute (still in force as Section
29-101 of the Idaho Code of 1947) provided that "All persons are
capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound mind,
and persons deprived of their civil rights." The court has decided
that this statute cannot be taken "to confer upon married women
the right to make any and all contracts ...and this is evident
from the fact that the act with relation to the wife becoming a
sole trader remains upon the statute book."'31 The sole trader
law, passed in 1875,32 regulated and restricted the right of a wife
to do business for herself and its repeal in 191738 does not seem
to have restored her general contractual capacity, if any she
ever had. While her capacity is not general she has been spe-
cifically enabled to make contracts relating to her separate
property,8 4 to manage and control the rents and profits thereof 5
and the earnings for her personal services.8 6 She has general
capacity to make marriage settlements3 7 and a contract entered
into in a state where her common law disabilities have been
removed will be enforced. 8 The court has finally arrived at the
formula that a married woman can contract in relation to her
31. Dernham and Kaufmann v. Rowley, 4 Idaho 753, 44 Pac. 643 (1896).
32. Territory of Idaho Acts, approved Jan. 17, 1875; IDAHO REV. STAT.
§§ 5850-5860 (1887).
33. Idaho Sess. Laws 1917, c. 158, p. 483.
34. IDAHO CODE § 32-904 (1947).
35. Id. §§ 32-906, 32-913.
36. Id. § 32-913.
37. Id. § 32-905.
38. Meier & Frank Co. v. Bruce, 30 Idaho 732, 168 Pac. 5 (1917).
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separate property, her personal services and for her own use and
benefit. 39
The above limitations create a situation where it is unusual
for a community debt to be incurred by the wife. However, since
compensation for her personal services and the rents and profits
of her separate estate fall into community, since contracts con-
cluded in other states where her common law disabilities have
been removed are enforced in Idaho and since conceivably con-
tracts made for her own use and benefit may also be for the
benefit of the community, the point may arise.
Supposing that the obstacle of the wife's incapacity is sur-
mounted, what is the liability of the wife's separate property for
a community debt? The court has erected another obstacle-this
one a requirement of pleading and proof. The court has uni-
formly held that no recovery can be had unless it is pleaded and
proved that the contract is for the use and benefit of the wife.
Two cases refused, because of this lack of pleading and proof,
to hold the wife liable on what very well may have been com-
munity obligations. 40  But when, as in Briggs v. Mason,4 the
complaint properly alleged that the wife specially promised to
pay a certain grocery bill and that the groceries were sold for
her use and benefit, the court allowed execution against the
wife's separate property. Here was a contract which was indeed
for her own use and benefit-for undoubtedly she consumed part
of the groceries and had an interest in providing for the family-
but it was also a contract that creates perhaps the most typical
of community debts. The court insists on the point of pleading
39. The statement made is about as far as it is safe to go. The whole
question merits a separate study. It is in crying need of legislative clarifica-
tion. More detailed information may be obtained from the following cases:
Vanderpool v. Bank of Hansen, 2 F.2d 877 (S.D. Idaho 1924); State ex rel.
Robins v. Clinger, 72 Idaho 222, 238 P.2d 1145 (1951); Loomis v. Gray, 60
Idaho 193, 90 P.2d 529 (1939); Craig v. Lane, 60 Idaho 178, 89 P.2d 1008 (1939);
Beckstead v. Gee, 58 Idaho 758, 79 P.2d 293 (1938); Pacific Acceptance Corp.
v. Myers, 49 Idaho 585, 290 Pac. 404 (1930); Farnworth v. Viet, 39 Idaho 40,
225 Pac. 1023 (1924); Howell v. Martin, 36 Idaho 468, 211 Pac. 528 (1922);
Overland National Bank v. Halveston, 33 Idaho 489, 196 Pac. 217 (1921);
Humbird Lumber Co. v. Doran, 24 Idaho 507, 135 Pac. 66 (1913); Tipton v.
Ellsworth, 18 Idaho 207, 109 Pac. 134 (1910); Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin,
14 Idaho 75, 93 Pac. 504 (1908); Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 Pac. 842
(1907); Holt v. Gridley, 7 Idaho 416, 63 Pac. 188 (1900); Strode v. Miller, 7
Idaho 16, 59 Pac. 893 (1900); Jaeckel v. Pease, 6 Idaho 131, 53 Pac. 399
(1898); Dernham and Kaufmann v. Rowley, 4 Idaho 753, 44 Pac. 643 (1896);
Bassett v. Beam, 4 Idaho 106, 36 Pac. 501 (1894).
40. Pacifl Acceptance Corp. v. Myers, 49 Idaho 585, 290 Pac. 404 (1930);
Ness v. Coffer, 42 Idaho 78, 244 Pac. 145 (1925).
41. 44 Idaho 283, 256 Pac. 368 (1927).
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but the question of whether separate property is liable for a
community debt is, for it, unworthy of notice.
Two other cases may have some bearing on the question.
In Booth Mercantile Co. v. Murphy42 the wife placed a mortgage
on her separate realty in Idaho to secure payment for furniture
and supplies purchased in Utah for a hotel business she was
operating in Utah. The court, in allowing the creditor to fore-
close, was indifferent to whether her domicile was in Utah or
Idaho and whether this was a Utah or Idaho contract since a
mortgage on her separate property had direct reference to her
separate property. The court concluded: "In a sense it would
be difficult to name a contract a married woman might make
that would not in some respects inure to the benefit of the com-
munity, but that fact alone does not lessen her obligation there-
on." Had this suit been for a deficiency judgment, the above
language might indicate that either "her own debts contracted
* . . after marriage" for which Section 32-911 renders her liable
or "contracts for her own use and benefit" within the formula
so constantly used by the court might be broad enough to
include a community debt. However the court was careful to
confine itself to the lien created by the mortgage and the state-
ment quoted rises no further than a dictum in regard to her
personal obligation or the availability of her separate property
not covered by the mortgage.
In Overland National Bank v. Halveston43 the bank sued to
recover on three promissory notes made by a wife, one for an
assessment on corporate stock which she claimed to be com-
munity property, a second for money borrowed from the bank
to cover an overdraft on the bank by her son, and a third for
the same purpose plus medical attendance for herself. The first
note according to the wife was a community obligation and the
third one was certainly a community obligation in part (for
medical attendance) and unless the bank dealt on the faith of
her separate credit the second note and the remainder of the
third note may also have been community obligations. The
court gave judgment against her on all three notes. The court
is concerned almost exclusively with her capacity to contract and
at one point says "she is capable of making contracts . . . to the
same extent as if she were unmarried. '44 The court is indifferent
42. 14 Idaho 212, 93 Pac. 777 (1908).
43. 33 Idaho 489, 196 Pac. 217 (1921).
44. Id. at 500, 196 Pac. at 221. This may have been a slip.
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to the availability of her separate property for the satisfaction
of a community obligation and holds with reference to the wife's
claim that the stock is community property that she is estopped
to deny that it is her separate property-this, not on the basis
of representations made but simply in the sense that she is
barred. Of course, if she is never allowed to avoid liability by
showing that the debt is a community debt, this means to the
realist that her separate property is liable for community debts.
In reality this case allows the separate property. of the wife to
be liable for a community debt but the court clouds its holding
in the language of estoppel and is unwilling to face the problem
and give a clear statement of what it is really doing.
It is difficult to draw any conclusion with confidence. While
it is possible to cite cases where the separate property of the
wife has been taken to satisfy a community debt, the court does
not think in these terms. The most that can be said is that a
contract which the wife has capacity to make, if properly pleaded
and proved to be for her own use and benefit, may bind her
separate property; for in such a case the court is willing to give
personal judgment against her. The court's interest is not in
the availability of the separate property but in pleading and
proof that the contract is for her own use and benefit.
This being the situation, it is certain that if the community
debt is not incurred by her but by her husband, her separate
property is not liable.45
There are few other cases of importance. One case decides
only a procedural point that the community is bound only if the
husband, having been served with process, is a party to the
action. The case is for the wife's slander.46 The court is careful
to exclude any indication of what the result might have been
had the husband been joined. Other cases merely enforce, for
the benefit of creditors, the provisions of the statutes before
noted.47
45. Thomas v. Young, 42 Idaho 240, 245 Pac. 75 (1926).
46. First National Bank of Sandpoint v. Samuels, 53 Idaho 780, 27 P.2d
959 (1933).
47. Section 32-911 to the effect that the separate property of the wife is
liable for her own debts was enforced in Sassaman v. Root, 37 Idaho 588,
218 Pac. 374 (1923), and Boise Ass'n of Credit Men, Ltd. v. Glenns Ferry
Meat Co., 48 Idaho 600, 283 Pac. 1038 (1930). Section 32-911 to the effect that
the separate property of the wife is not liable for the debts of the husband
was enforced in McKeehan v. Vollmer-Clearwater Co., 30 Idaho 505, 166 Pac.
256 (1917); Bank of Orofino v. Wellman, 26 Idaho 425, 143 Pac. 1169 (1914);
Baldwin v. McFarland, 26 Idaho 85, 141 Pac. 76 (1914); Holt v. Gridley, 7
Idaho 416, 63 Pac. 188 (1900); Young v. First National Bank of Hailey, 4
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We set out in Table II the liabilities of the different kinds
of separate and community property.
IV
This table includes only the hfare bones of the statutes and
the cases. It is appropriate to complete it by a few propositions
that may be taken for granted and others resulting from infer-
ences and a fortiori reasoning. For instance, it may be taken for
granted that the separate property of the husband is liable for
all his antenuptial debts arising not only out of contract but
arising as well from his torts or other obligations imposed by
law. The same may be said of his postnuptial separate debts.
Idaho 323, 39 Pac. 557 (1895). This result was taken for granted in Feltham
v. Blunck, 34 Idaho 1, 198 Pac. 763 (1921). Section 11-204 to the effect that
the "rents, issues and profits" of the separate property of the wife are
"exempt from execution against her husband" was enforced in McCarthy
v. Paris, 46 Idaho 165, 267 Pac. 232 (1928); Evans v. Kroutinger, 9 Idaho
153, 72 Pac. 882 (1903); Thorn v. Anderson, 7 Idaho 421, 63 Pac. 592 (1900),
and Humbird Lumber Co. v. Doran, 24 Idaho 507, 135 Pac. 66 (1913) dictum.
The provision of Section 11-204 that "all compensation due and owing [the
wife] for her personal services is exempt from execution against her hus-
band" came before the court for interpretation in McMillan v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163, 280 Pac. 220 (1929). It was held that the privilege
of exemption is lost when the compensation is paid to the wife and she uses
it in the purchase of other property. Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92
Pac. 842 (1907), held that the wife was personally liable on her contract to
pay for her own bed and board.
48. IDAHO CODE § 32:911 (1947) as applied in the cases set out in notes
46 and 47 supra.
49. IDAHO CODE § 32-910 (1947).
50. Id. § 11-204 as applied in the cases set out in note 47 supra.
51. This is the result of Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106, 178 Pac. 703 (1919).
The court made no distinction as to whether the debt was antenuptial or
postnuptial or whether incurred for his own use or for the benefit of the
community. This result may be inferred also as to community debts from
Gustin v. Byam, 41 Idaho 538, 240 Pac. 600 (1925), and Pittock v. Pittock,
15 Idaho 47, 96 Pac. 212 (1908), and the court clearly so held in McMillan
v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 48 Idaho 163, 280 Pac. 220 (1929).
52. It was taken for granted in Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106, 178 Pac.
703 (1919), that the separate property of the husband would be liable for
his debts-all his debts both antenuptial and postnuptial, and both com-
munity and separate. Such is also the understanding of Jacob, The Law of
Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1 (1931).
53. This is the result of Hall v. Johns, 17 Idaho 224, 105 Pac. 71 (1909).
54. With some misgivings the word "no" is placed here for both com-
munity and separate debts resulting from the husband's tort. It results
from Great American Indemnity Co. of New York v. Garrison, 75 F. Supp.
811 (E.D. Wash. 1948). It is hard to believe that this was not a community
tort. It was committed while the husband was on a job (treasurer of Clear-
water County), the wages from which certainly would be community prop-
erty, and the moneys misappropriated probably were spent for family
expenses.
55. This is probably a safe conclusion from the fact that the court in
First National Bank of Sandpoint v. Samuels, 53 Idaho 780, 27 P.2d 959
(1933), affirmed the trial court decision that a judgment for the wife's
slander was not a lien on community realty.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
When Section 32-910 provides that the separate property of
the husband is not liable for the debts of the wife contracted
before marriage, it is safe to say that the draftsman meant in-
curred before marriage. If the husband is not to be liable for
his wife's antenuptial contracts a fortiori, he is not to be liable
for her torts or other obligations imposed by law. In the same
vein the husband's separate property should not be available
for the payment of the wife's postnuptial separate debts.
The lawyer in Idaho is pretty safe in assuming that the
general community property (that is, that part of it outside of
the special exemption provided for by Section 11-204) is liable
for all debts of the husband both antenuptial and postnuptial,
and both community and separate. This is certainly the spirit of
Holt v. Empey.5 6 It is the assumption of Jacob 57 and of the
bench and bar of my acquaintance. If there is any exception, it
is that of a separate tort of the husband incurred while a public
officer as held in the Federal District Court decision in Great
American Indemnity Co. of New York v. Garrison.58 It is be-
lieved that this case would not be followed by the Supreme
Court of Idaho. This position is strengthened by inferences from
the case of McMillan v. United States Fire Insurance Co.59
There community property, bought with the wife's wages, was
held available for the payment of a community contract debt of
the husband. It was argued that this was within the exemption
provided for by Section 11-204. The court rejected the argument
because, as required by Section 11-204, once the wages are paid
they are no longer "due and owing." So community property,
about which no exemption argument exists, is liable for the debt
of the husband. Nothing is predicated on the fact that the partic-
ular kind of debt involved arose out of contract and it is believed
therefore that the general community property is liable for all
debts incurred by the husband whether arising out of contract,
tort or other obligations imposed by law.
This is about as far as it is safe to go on propositions that
may be taken for granted and others resulting from inferences
and a fortiori reasoning. The result is set out in Table III.
56. See note 51 supra.
57. Jacob, The Law of Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1, 37
(1931).
58. 75 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1948).
59. 48 Idaho 163, 280 Pac. 220 (1929).
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V
It will be noticed that there are some gaps. It is believed
that, as the matter now stands, no one can safely fill in any of
the gaps. There is neither statute, decision nor a safe inference
on which to rely.
At this point it may be well to make the observation that
altogether too much of the law of Idaho as revealed in Tables
II and III comes from the cases and from mere inference.
A serious burden is placed on business dealings when the
creditor is asked to deal under the threat of a law suit to make
his position certain. Adequate and precise answers should be
supplied by the statutes, and the time is ripe for a committee of
lawyers, bankers and businessmen to study the inadequacies of
the law and, after careful study, formulate a clearly expressed
policy. The proposed policy should be given wide publicity and
remain for some time a target for further study and criticism.
After all questions have been threshed out, then a text should
be presented to the legislature for enactment.
It is not the purpose of this paper to draft such a text. That
is beyond the ken of any one man. Rather it is proposed to take
up and discuss the principal gaps as revealed by Table III and
make some observations that might be useful in any further
study undertaken. When a gap appears, it has long been the
habit of both lawyers in their briefs and the court in its decisions
to follow "the weight of authority." He who can count the
most cases in his favor or the most states has a pretty good
chance of prevailing. It is even an exaggeration, in many suits,
to say that the cases are counted. What is counted is the number
of citations of cases in American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris
and Corpus Juris Secundum, for outside of three or four of the
larger centers there is a lack of adequate library coverage of
both law reports and statutes ° When it is realized that the
encyclopedias cite cases for about everything they say as well
as what they hold and that cases will be cited from both common
law and community property states, one begins to see on what a
slender thread many a case in the trial courts must hang. If this
is a true description of how cases are decided, it highlights the
desirability of a legislative solution.
60. Professor Jacob deplored the "want of library resources" in Idaho
in his article on The Law of Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L.J. 1,
121 (1931).
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The first gap is the question: is community property avail-
able to the creditor for the payment of antenuptial debts incurred
by the wife? We already know from the statutes that the sep-
arate property of the husband is not available for their payment 6'
and that the separate property of the wife is available.62 What
of the availability of community property?
No Idaho case answers this question. But the Supreme Court
of Idaho has decided that the separate debts of the wife con-
tracted after marriage cannot be satisfied out of community
property.63 Section 32-911 renders the separate property of the
wife liable for debts contracted both before and after marriage,
and if this fund is the only one liable for debts contracted after
marriage, by the same reasoning it must be the only fund liable
for debts contracted before marriage since both are equally
within the section. If Hall v. Johns is to be followed, we may
then expect that the Supreme Court will decide that the com-
munity is not liable.
Is this a correct interpretation of Section 32-911? The infer-
ence that, because the wife's separate property is liable, the
community is not liable does not necessarily follow. In reality
there is a gap. The section says the separate property is liable
and says nothing about the community one way or the other.
An early California court faced with this question of a gap said
it must be solved "by considerations arising from the rule of
the common law"6 4 and since by the common law the husband
is liable for the debts of the wife contracted dum sola, he is still
to be liable.65 But community property comes from the Spanish
law and when a gap appears, reference should first be made to
it under the principle that when a legislature adopts a statute
from another law it impliedly adopts that other law's interpre-
tation along with the statute.
Looking at the Spanish law we find that neither spouse is
liable for the antenuptial debts of the other, but all the property
of each is liable for his or her own debts. Since the wife owns a
one-half interest in the community, that half is to be liable for
61. IDAHO CODE § 32-910 (1947).
62. Id. § 11-204 as applied in the cases set out in note 47 supra.
63. Hall v. Johns, 17 Idaho 224, 105 Pac. 71 (1909).
64. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860).
65. At this time in California the husband was the owner of the com-
munity and the wife had a mere expectancy. The California statute said
the husband's separate property was not liable and so the community was
liable as the only property of the husband not expressly exempted.
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her debts, but since her share cannot be determined until dis-
solution of the community, the community is not liable during
coverture. 6 Thus the decision that the community is not, during
coverture, to be liable for the antenuptial debts of the wife
follows the Spanish law and is presumably what the legislature
meant to adopt when the community system was taken over.
Admitting the above interpretation, is this solution one
which we must accept as part of our law or should it be changed
by legislative action? The reason given for the non-liability of
the community for antenuptial debts is that the community
property system has considered the well being and interests of
the family of more importance than the rights of creditors."
But this looks like outlawing the creditor just because he is a
creditor. After all, ours is a credit economy and before we write
the creditor off let us consider his position. In favor of a con-
trary rule Judge Speer of Texas has said that unmarried persons
who were debt-ridden could escape into marriage knowing that
their future earnings and acquisitions thenceforth could not be
reached by their antenuptial creditors.6 8 This reasoning is par-
ticularly forceful in states like Idaho, Louisiana and Texas where
rents and profits of separate property fall into community. It is
less so in the other community property states where they re-
main separate. Consider the case of the modern young woman
earning a good salary as a lawyers' stenographer. She rents an
apartment and buys $1000 worth of electrical equipment on
credit. Her marriage marketability in Idaho will be high. All
unwittingly her trusting creditor has supplied her with a $1000
dowry. If, like most young women, she has no separate prop-
erty, he will have to wait for the dissolution of the community
before he can collect. In the meantime the couple has used the
equipment and worn it out. And during coverture the com-
munity is being enriched by her earnings.
Here is a proper place for the legislature to act. We should
neither worship history just because it is history nor look with
hostility upon the creditor just because he is a modem phenome-
non. Even in states where rents and profits of separate property
remain separate, the ancient rule might be considered inadequate
for the wife may have no separate property at the time of
marriage and the couple can thus sponge on the creditor to the
66. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 165 (1943).
67. Id. § 158.
68. SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 385 (3d ed. 1929).
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extent of the rental value of the property sold. But the case for
the creditor is stronger in Idaho, Louisiana and Texas where
rents and profits of separate property fall into community. In
those states two solutions might seriously be considered by the
legislature. First, make the entire community property available
for the payment of the debt on the principle that the community,
having profited from both the use of the property and the work
and labor of the wife, should shoulder the burden of paying the
bill or second, the community should be reachable to the extent
of one-half. The second solution involves difficulties of appraisal
and accounting which might render it impractical. Whatever the
solution adopted, certainly this is a situation for legislative
action.
VI
Another gap, which poses a number of problems, is the
question of what property is available for satisfaction of com-
munity debts incurred by the wife. We have already seen that
Section 32-911 makes her liable "for her own debts contracted
before or after marriage," that, as to capacity, she may contract
in relation to her separate property, her personal services and
for her own use and benefit. Such of these contracts as create
community obligations have received scant attention from the
court and rather haltingly has it allowed her separate property
to be liable. The whole matter should be clarified by statute.
There seems to be little reason why the wife should not be
given complete contractual capacity. She already has enough for
most practical purposes, but the existence of any limitation at
all leads to expensive litigation. There is no evidence that the
power to contract without limitation, that a wave of legislation
in the early part of this century carried to women in twenty-
seven jurisdictions, 69 has led to untoward results. If the wife
must keep her promise when she goes surety for a member of
her family or signs an appeal bond for a friend,O it may teach
her a wholesome lesson of responsibility. With complete con-
tractual capacity her separate property would be available to
satisfy both separate and community debts incurred by her, and
she would take her place in the marital partnership as an equal
of her husband.
69. The count of jurisdictions is that of Vernier in 3 AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 35 (1935). Probably since 1935 many other jurisdictions have joined
the list.
70. She is not now liable. Craig v. Lane, 60 Idaho 178, 89 P.2d 1008
(1939); Beckstead v. Gee, 58 Idaho 758, 79 P.2d 293 (1938).
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There is also no adequate reason why debts arising from
tort and other obligations imposed by law should not bind her
separate property. This is true under present law if we are will-
ing to interpret the word "contracted" in Section 32-911 to mean
"incurred" so that it will read "the separate property of the wife
. . . is liable for her own debts incurred before and after mar-
riage." Whatever may be thought of the above propositions as a
matter of policy, they should be discussed by the bar and the
public and clarified by positive legislative enactment.
A more difficult question concerns the availability of com-
munity property for the payment of community debts incurred
by the wife. The wife has been given the management and con-
trol of "the earnings for her personal services and the rents and
profits of her separate estate."' 71 Both of these fall into com-
munity in Idaho,7 2 and both of these are declared to be "exempt
from execution against her husband."'7' By argument e con-
trario does this mean that these two elements of community
property are not exempt from execution against the wife? Prob-
ably. This is the least that could be expected. But the matter
should not be left to guesswork. The statutes should expressly
so state. The question may attain considerable practical im-
portance. Suppose a woman with some fortune and excellent
earning capacity marries a man with no fortune who from in-
competency is unable to earn after marriage. If the wife retains
her job and invests her fortune wisely, the two elements men-
tioned will constitute about all the community property available
to creditors. It would seem clear then that the community
within Section 11-204 should be available for the satisfaction of
community debts incurred by the wife.
The problem of whether community outside of Section
11-204 (that is community property generally) should be liable
for community debts incurred by the wife raises questions of
fundamental policy about which opinion is sure to be divided.
At present our law splits the community down the middle and
puts one part (the rents and profits of the wife's separate estate
and earnings for her personal services) under her management
and control and all the rest under his. It gives her in addition a
veto power in transactions relating to community realty and the
71. IDAHO CODE § 32-913 (1947).
72. Id. § 32-906.
73. Id. § 11-204.
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mortgaging of exempt property by requiring her signature.14
The fact that her part is exempt from execution against her
husband under Section 11-204 would, by symmetry of reasoning,
lead us to conclude that his.part (that outside Section 11-204) is
exempt from execution against her. This. is probably the law in
Idaho, although no statute or case says so.
Whether it should be the law, that is, whether the legislature
in attempting to enact what is an ideal policy should alter it,
presents a very difficult question. It raises the fundamental issue
of whether the present division of control resulting from Sec-
tions 11-204, 32-912 and 32-913 is wise. As the law stands each
spouse controls what he or she can earn and the rents and profits
of his or her separate property. Whether the common kitty,
which we call community property, should be under joint con-
trol75 and the debts created by one spouse be payable out of the
money earned by the other depends on how much pooling mar-
riage entails. Does the union of two hearts require the union of
two purses? That it does, in all the successful marriages, is a
fact of everyday life. But it is precisely in the successful
marriage where rules are not needed and will not be followed.
The rules are made for the moments of stress and strain76 and
must exist in order that the creditor too may not be sacrificed
on the altar of marital discord. Perhaps a case may clarify the
problem. An outsider views H and W as an ideal and united
couple. He sells one of them a bill of goods. When the bill is not
paid, a second look reveals H and W, battling with fang and
claw, for a divorce. In picking up the pieces, for the purpose of
satisfying his claim, must the creditor be careful to attach only
items of property earned by the spouse who purchased or may
he attach anything that is community property without regard
to which spouse earned it? It comes down to this: Is the creditor
entitled to say to the wife who complains that the creditor is
attaching some property she has bought with her earnings or
her income: "When I sold the goods to your husband you were
happily married and I supposed you would allow your earnings
74. Id. § § 32-912, 45-1102.
75. It has been suggested that measures for joint control might take
over some of the rules (but not all) of the commercial partnership. Daggett,
Is Joint Control of Community Property Possible!, 10 TULANE L. REV. 589
(1936).
76. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COL. L. REV. 1281, 1304
(1932), states Erlich's view to the effect that "rules for courts regarding
husband and wife should be built in terms not of marriage, but of separation
and divorce."
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and income to be used to pay for the goods. All the good wives
I know do that." And, is the wife entitled to reply: "You ought
to grow up. You know any marriage may go on the rocks and
when you sell to my husband you had better look at his income
and not at mine." The first policy favors the sale of goods and
discourages divorce; the second favors cautious extension of
credit, jittery marriages and easier divorce. May a wise God
give wisdom to his legislature to make a wise decision.
